debka_notion | Upcoming Final

Upcoming Final

I'm rather nervous about my Talmud final now- I'm surprised I wasn't before. But I'm also feeling like obsessing over it now won't actually do me much good at this point. So- we'll see how it goes, but it's tomorrow at 9am, so after that I can nap, prep for my Hebrew reading test in the early afternoon, and then I'm into prepping for the take home exam, that exam itself, the paper and my application.

Outside of that, today was the last day of classes, and my Hebrew listening final was pretty reasonable, I think. A little weird, but reasonable.

And I went to part of (unfortunately I had to leave early) Rabbis Roth and Rabinowitz's talk on why they resigned from the CJLS- I really did respect what they were saying, and I was really relieved that neither plan on leaving JTS, or the Conservative movement. I was interested that their reasons were really quite different: Rabbi Roth disagreed with the halakhic reasoning of the Dorff/Nevins/Reisner paper, and Rabbi Rabinowitz took issue both with the halakhic reasoning and with the general make-up and format of the CJLS as an institution. What I thought was fascinating, in a sort of strange way, was that Rabbi Rabinowitz said that he'd go from a position that facilitated his resigning from the CJLS in protest to one that would be on the far left, "uprooting a principle from the torah", if it could be proved to him that doing so would benefit Jewish society as a whole and not just folks who are gay. I think that that's a really interesting position, although I somehow can't quite parse it into something that makes complete sense in my brain. It's kind of funky: at the same time I can see where he's coming from, from a traditionalist perspective, and I can also totally object, because how could he say that something that would improve so many lives Not be good for Jewish society at large? (At the same time, I suppose one could have made that same argument for the driving teshuvah, and that didn't help us any. But I don't think it's Really the same argument in this case. In the case of worries about this leading to the Conservative movement generally becoming a non-halakhic movement- now That worry I understand.) Rabbi Roth's issues were much more conventionally understandable from a halakhic perspective, although I'd Love to spend some time looking at what he was talking about in detail at some point. It showed me exactly how much I have to learn about the process and general hierarchy of halakhic authority and chain of transmission, which was both inspiring and intimidating.

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One of the perks about being in cantorial school is that nobody ever tells us about sessions like this. It improves our resonance by keeping our skulls all echo-ey.

Eep. Sorry- if I'd known you didn't hear about such things, I'd have told you... I can start forwarding you the rabbinical school weekly events calendar or something. It's usually a waste of space, though, for the most part.

I think I'd appreciate that. I mean, I know that most of it will probably be internal stuff that doesn't interest me, but occasionally there'll be things that all JTS students ought to know about.

I have been very annoyed on multiple levels at the fact that everyone has been treating this issue as though it only affected the rabbinical school. If JTS decides to ordain gay clergy, it will have a huge demographic effect on the cantorial school, and the departure of four CJLS members (including two of the movement's most prominent poskim) matters to everyone, not just rabbis and future rabbis.

There seems to be an assumption among the rabbinical school staff that the other schools are running their own programming about this stuff. I'm not sure why they think that, or why they think each school should do their own thing, but that seems to be what they're thinking- at least as far as some stuff that they've said out loud.

What has been going on in the cantorial school with this?

What has been going on in the cantorial school with this?

Individual students chattering in the hallways about what this may or may not mean for us, and trying to clarify what each of the positions says.

That's it? You'd think that the conversations about what each position says would be something they'd spend more time on with you, since we're theoretically being trained to do that stuff, and you folks, as far as I understand, are not getting much training in that... Perhaps you should talk to your dean/CSSO about running some programming/making our programming joint programming? I don't see why anyone would possibly object to that...

"because how could he say that something that would improve so many lives Not be good for Jewish society at large"

I think that's actually the crucial point and hits the nail squarely on the head. Unraveling the perceived integrity of a system which gives so many of its adherents the structure and meaning that allows them to do good in the world may indeed outweigh the needs of the comparatively fewer gay contingent. All decisions in life are a weighing of different values, and no matter how "good" a decision we make, someone's going to get hurt. If it helps, try thinking about something that might be good for the world at large but not good for the Jews. (Pick anything -- Israel's existence, circumcision, shehita.) How do you weigh that sort of thing? I tend to disagree heartily and mightily with Rabinowitz, and I wonder whether he's considered the full implications of this position, but I think he's really gotten to the core of the matter with this articulation.

(I also think the issues with homosexuality are more numerous, running right to the core of sexuality and the social implications of defining our identities by who we have sex with, which was the point of R. Levy's paper.)

I think that's why he said that if it were proved that it would be helpful, rather than unravelling the perceived integrity of the system by doing shoddy (in his opinion- I'm not making my own judgement here) halakhic process, he would follow the same procedure as the teshuva permitting kohanim to marry divorcees. That also only helps a small group, uproots a principle from the torah, and doesn't do much for society at large- and yet it didn't provoke this sort of reaction. (Although the fact that any such marriages are valid b'dievad certainly does make a difference.) Nevertheless, the fact that he seems ok with this previous decision and not with this one does suggest that there's something going on with him that's underlying his feeling that this isn't good for Jewish society as a whole.

I'm not entirely sure how to phrase any of this, but his statements, while hitting on an important perspective, seem to suggest that perhaps he finds homosexuality uncomfortable even from a secular perspective, or perhaps that part of what is going on is a fear of the unknown, as far as what sorts of societal changes would accompany an acceptance of homosexuality in Jewish society- a sense of "better the enemy you know". That's what bothers me about his statements.

The basic reasoning of the kohen-gerusha teshuva was that the intermarriage rate represents a need for a hora'at sha`ah la`aqor davar min ha-Torah. So while it affects a minority of cases, it was rationalized as being about helping the Jewish people as a whole.* (I think it's pretty obvious why that teshuva didn't cause the stir it should have, and it's not because kiddushin tofesin bedeiavad.)

I think you're probably right that he's uncomfortable with homosexuality, although without knowing more I can't say whether it's for good Levy-esque reasons or bad reasons. Since I'm not a fan of his halakhic reasoning in general, as evidenced by several of his teshuvot, I'm less inclined to be dan lekhaf zechut that he's not simply dressing up latent (or not so latent) homophobia. But even if he's a homophobe, he could still be meisiah lefi tumo, and making an important point. (I like the concurring opinion of R. Loel Weiss, found on the RA site -- he makes the point that sometimes you just have to set some rules, especially when the cost of overturning will spell the end of the integrity of the system involved.)

* I'm not defending that teshuva at all -- I don't think the intermarriage rate represents a hora'at sha`ah, I don't think that the CJLS is a beit din qualified to uproot, I don't think that they did an adequate analysis of the halakhic or contextual parameters of `akira, and most crucially of all I don't think they weighed the countervailing values properly.

I'm afraid that I don't personally see a real connection between intermarriage and the prohibition on a kohen marrying a divorcee. Allowing one thing that isn't relevant for all that many people is going to keep other people from marrying gentiles? I'm not sure if I've read any of R. Rabinowitz's tshuvot, actually, so I don't know. But- there certainly seemed to be that aspect of things going on. The point about setting some rules for the sake of the system is one of those things that is making me uncomfortable about this whole business...

I think the argument (which I agree is weak) is that (1) _that_ kohen + gerusha couple will have an endogamous marriage, which if we refused to marry them might (I suppose in the event of a breakup) cause them to give on Judaism and marry outside of the fold; (2) overriding a biblical prohibition for the sake of endogomy shows just how serious we are about endogomy and fighting intermarriage.

"The point about setting some rules for the sake of the system is one of those things that is making me uncomfortable about this whole business..."

I'd love to hear more about your discomfort with this. It seems to me that without the value of maintaining the integrity of the symbol-system which its adherents find meaningful, most of halakha should be thrown out the window, since very little makes sense on its own outside of its internal symbol/linguistic context.

But if we're serious about intermarriage Because halakha says we shouldn't do it, then messing with halakha to save halakha is well- sort of self-contradictory.

Sorry that was unclear. My issue is that I agree, a symbol-system requires some integrity, and the halakhic system is a ridiculous mishmash in many ways already: I sometimes wonder if it can take much more mishmashing in such a short timespan, which allowing homosexuality does do. On the other hand, sometimes it seems like mishmashing Is what the constant aspect of halakha is, to some extent. I feel like part of the problem here is that many folks see the Dorff/Nevins/Reisner paper as simply doing what the Rabbis did in reading the eye for an eye business as mandating a financial repayment. It's only those of us who insist/know enough to know that halakha works with precedent and that older Rabbinic text has more authority than newer text who have trouble this way. So if you look at it from a descent-of-generations, then it's hard to accept the Dorff etc paper. And if you're willing to ignore the linearity of time and/or if you aren't invested in any sort of revelation, and believe in evolving morals, then Dorff etc are doing a good thing and perfectly validly. When one gets into the standing-on-the-shoulders-of-giants position, that seems to be (for me at least) where the ambivalent positions tend to come up. So- how much do I value the actual positions of the giants before me, and how much can I accept that sometimes their cultural circumstances biasing their halakhic positions- and if the latter, how much can I disregard those decisions because of that fact.

The other related aspect that makes me uncomfortable is the attitude that I keep picking up on "well, we'll maintain that this forbids male-male anal sex, but we firmly intend to rule this way becuase we have to based on the text, but we're making it clear we won't be putting any emphasis on this and will basically be turning a blind eye" attitude. The idea that from the outset, many people are planning on using this as a blanket acceptance of something that is considered by everyone a issur d'oraita is really troubling me. Read on its own, the Dorff teshuvah seems like a moral and reasonable document, before becoming aware of R. Roth's concerns. Read in the light of these social attitudes- I worry. I think that in a community with more dedication to halakha and to struggling to uphold halakha, I would have much less trouble with the teshuvah, because it would be a real position in the community rather than something that will be taken as either a first step towards something that does simply disregard the Torah text, or as a wink and nod towards doing whatever the couple would like without caring what the halakha says about it.

(I also really dislike the "but that's so Hard, it can't be a Real Relationship for gays without anal sex" attitude that is floating around. Sure, I expect it's hard for some- but a. I went to enough gay/straight alliance stuff and conferences in high school to know that not every gay relationship, even every long term gay relationship necessarily involves anal sex, and b. taharat hamishpakha is also difficult, not engaging in premarital sex during a long relationship prior ot marriage is hard, and halakha asks those of every heterosexual couple. It's bad reasoning, as far as I can tell.)

"But if we're serious about intermarriage Because halakha says we shouldn't do it, then messing with halakha to save halakha is well- sort of self-contradictory."

Well, that's the whole basis of at least one understanding of "eit la`asot lashem, hefeiru toratekha". (I forget whether the issur to write down Torah she-be-al-peh is de'oraita or derabbanan, but there's an example of permanently violating a negative commandment for the sake of the greater good.) But you do raise an interesting formalist point -- if the issur on intermarriage is only derabanan (which at least Tosafot suggest), then it might be invalid to violate a de'oraita prohibition to protect a derabanan.

(BTW, it's funny how this all makes me come off sounding. Mostly I think it's important to acknowledge the theoretical flexibility built into the formalism -- I don't think using it lekhatehila is smart or mutar.)

Fascinating point in your second paragraph. I don't think following precedent is necessarily a function of a yeridat ha-dorot mindset, except insofar as yeridat ha-dorot is an articulation of the human psychological need for connection to the past and a lack of surety that one has figured out the whole range of consequences involved in changing the form of a particular practice. (To stretch the metaphor, even for dwarves-on-giants people, if you cut the shoulders off the giants, you're screwed.)

I don't think that "that sometimes their cultural circumstances biasing their halakhic positions" is a good way of phrasing things. Of course cultural circumstances "biased" their halakhic positions -- we're all products of our culture, in the most all-encompassing sense! The question is to what extent identifying those cultural factors is useful in confronting new challenges in a different culture. I think a more productive way to look at it would be from the perspective of language. Halakha is a language -- it has grammatical elements ("legal/hermeneutical principles") and a vocabulary ("texts"). We can translate that language into the component values, needs, and consequences -- and if we think we've done a good enough job of that, and understand all sides of their position and our challenge well enough, then we can go back and rephrase the new position in halakhic language. I find it most frustrating when people fail to make that crucial distinction (between halakha as language and halakha as set of decisions embodying human responses to human problems), but it's an easy mistake to make because halakhic texts themselves sometimes use value-(sounding?)-language in legal-semantic ways.

Your point about believing in evolving morals is a good one -- I'm slowly coming around to thinking that phrasing things in such a way blinds us to the extent to which we're missing the harm we're still causing, and will inevitable cause.

"The idea that from the outset, many people are planning on using this as a blanket acceptance of something that is considered by everyone a issur d'oraita is really troubling me."

R. Steve Greenberg once told a liberal Orthodox rabbi who advises gay men to avoid the de-oraita(s) and just do the derabanans: "Great, thanks, that lets us just do what we want anyway." I don't think that liberal O rabbi gives the same advice any more, at least not without real care.

I also think you're spot-on about criticizing the anal sex/relationship connection. I'm sure there are plenty of heterosexual couples where one person desires certain sex acts and the other doesn't -- they work it out, or, if the desire and repulsion are too powerful, they get divorced.

"Mostly I think it's important to acknowledge the theoretical flexibility built into the formalism -- I don't think using it lekhatehila is smart or mutar."
What do you mean by this? Could you elaborate a little?

I think both perspectives (yeridat ha'dorot and "standing-on-giants'-shoulders") involve the need to connect to the past- they just articulate the connection in ways that give the people at whichever end more or less power- if you're standing on a giant's shoulders, giving it a haircut, or even chopping off it's head is possibly doable, if messy (this makes sense in my head, even though it may not in transmission). By the other theory, one has no authority to do so.

I'm really finding your language metaphor interesting and potentially useful, but I'm still working on grokking it, as it were.

I do think that occasionally filtering out inapplicable cultural influences can be useful as a viewpoint and as a stretegy, used carefully. The question is possibly then how to do so without filling in too much of our own cultural influences that are not really connected to the source materials.

On the other hand, if one can help people to feel like they are doing their best to uphold a difficult and painful system that is still very important to them- then shouldn't we do so? If making the distinctions clear so that they can sin in smaller ways would help them, then can we really chose not to do so? It does seem to be an area where I can really see the advantage of having psak given to individuals rather than by committee to the general community: I am really starting to see the point made by R. Rabinowitz about the problems inherent in the CJLS and in halakha-by-committee, much as I think it's a fascinating process.

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